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madbase/M0_PROGRESS.md
Vlad Durnea 8ade39ae2d
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M0 security hardening: fix all vulnerabilities and resolve build errors
- Fix 5 source files corrupted with markdown formatting by previous AI
- Remove secret logging from auth middleware, signup, and recovery handlers
- Add role validation (ALLOWED_ROLES allowlist) to all 10 data_api + storage handlers
- Fix JavaScript injection in Deno runtime via double-serialization
- Add UUID validation to TUS upload paths to prevent path traversal
- Gate token issuance on email confirmation (AUTH_AUTO_CONFIRM env var)
- Reject unconfirmed users on login with 403
- Prevent OAuth account takeover (409 on email conflict with different provider)
- Replace permissive CORS (allow_origin Any) with ALLOWED_ORIGINS env var
- Wire session-based admin auth into control plane, add POST /platform/v1/login
- Hide secrets from list_projects API via ProjectSummary struct
- Add missing deps (redis, uuid, chrono, tower-http fs feature)
- Fix http version mismatch between reqwest 0.11 and axum 0.7 in proxy
- Clean up all unused imports across workspace

Build: zero errors, zero warnings. Tests: 10 passed, 0 failed.
Made-with: Cursor
2026-03-15 12:54:21 +02:00

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Markdown

# M0 Security Hardening — Progress Report
**Status: Complete**
**Build: `cargo build --workspace` — zero errors**
**Tests: `cargo test --workspace` — 10 passed, 0 failed, 2 ignored**
---
## 0.1 — Secrets & Credential Hygiene
| Fix | File | Detail |
|-----|------|--------|
| Remove JWT secret logging | `auth/src/middleware.rs` | `tracing::info!` with secret value → `tracing::debug!` without value |
| Remove confirmation token logging | `auth/src/handlers.rs` | `token={}` removed from signup log |
| Remove recovery token logging | `auth/src/handlers.rs` | `token={}` removed from recover log, non-existent email log downgraded to `debug` |
| JWT_SECRET required + 32-char min | `common/src/config.rs` | `expect()` with clear message, `len() < 32` panics |
| S3 credentials required | `storage/src/backend.rs` | `S3_ACCESS_KEY` / `MINIO_ROOT_USER` via `expect()` |
| ADMIN_PASSWORD required | `gateway/src/control.rs` | Login handler reads `ADMIN_PASSWORD` env var, panics if unset |
## 0.2 — Authentication & Authorization
| Fix | File | Detail |
|-----|------|--------|
| Session-based admin auth | `gateway/src/admin_auth.rs` | UUID sessions, 24h expiry, cookie + header validation |
| Admin auth wired into control plane | `gateway/src/control.rs` | `from_fn_with_state(admin_auth_state, ...)` |
| Login endpoint | `gateway/src/control.rs` | `POST /platform/v1/login` — validates `ADMIN_PASSWORD`, creates session, sets `HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict` cookie |
| Tests | `gateway/src/admin_auth.rs` | 5 passing tests for session accept/reject/dashboard/login bypass |
## 0.3 — Injection & Input Sanitization
| Fix | File | Detail |
|-----|------|--------|
| SQL injection in `SET LOCAL role` | `data_api/src/handlers.rs` | `ALLOWED_ROLES` allowlist + `validate_role()` called before each `SET LOCAL role` in all 5 handlers |
| SQL injection in `SET LOCAL role` | `storage/src/handlers.rs` | Same `ALLOWED_ROLES` + `validate_role()` in all 5 handlers |
| JavaScript injection in Deno | `functions/src/deno_runtime.rs` | Payload/headers double-serialized; JS uses `JSON.parse()` to decode safely |
| Path traversal in TUS uploads | `storage/src/tus.rs` | `validate_upload_id()` requires valid UUID; `get_upload_path()` and `get_info_path()` return `Result` |
## 0.4 — Token & Session Security
| Fix | File | Detail |
|-----|------|--------|
| Signup: gate tokens on confirmation | `auth/src/handlers.rs` | `AUTH_AUTO_CONFIRM=true` → auto-confirm + issue tokens; otherwise → empty tokens |
| Login: reject unconfirmed users | `auth/src/handlers.rs` | `email_confirmed_at.is_none()` → 403 Forbidden (unless auto-confirm) |
| OAuth: CSRF state presence check | `auth/src/oauth.rs` | Callback rejects empty `state` param; full Redis-backed validation deferred to M3 |
| OAuth: prevent account takeover | `auth/src/oauth.rs` | Existing email with different provider/provider_id → 409 Conflict (no silent linking) |
| OAuth: confirm email on creation | `auth/src/oauth.rs` | New OAuth users get `email_confirmed_at = now()` |
## 0.5 — CORS & Transport Security
| Fix | File | Detail |
|-----|------|--------|
| Restrict CORS origins (control) | `gateway/src/control.rs` | `ALLOWED_ORIGINS` env var parsed → `AllowOrigin::list(...)`, explicit methods/headers, credentials enabled |
| Restrict CORS origins (worker) | `gateway/src/worker.rs` | Same `ALLOWED_ORIGINS``AllowOrigin::list(...)`, explicit methods/headers including `apikey`, credentials enabled |
| Hide secrets in list_projects | `control_plane/src/lib.rs` | `ProjectSummary` struct (id, name, status, created_at) — no `db_url`, `jwt_secret`, `anon_key`, `service_role_key` |
---
## Additional Fixes (pre-existing build issues resolved)
| Fix | File | Detail |
|-----|------|--------|
| Markdown corruption in 5 files | `auth/src/handlers.rs`, `data_api/src/handlers.rs`, `storage/src/handlers.rs`, `gateway/src/control.rs`, `gateway/src/worker.rs` | Previous AI embedded markdown formatting in Rust source; stripped and restored |
| Missing `fs` feature for `tower-http` | `gateway/Cargo.toml` | Added `"fs"` feature for `ServeDir` |
| Missing `redis` workspace dep | `Cargo.toml`, `common/Cargo.toml`, `gateway/Cargo.toml` | Added `redis = { version = "0.25", features = ["tokio-comp", "aio"] }` |
| Missing `uuid`/`chrono` deps | `gateway/Cargo.toml`, `common/Cargo.toml` | Added workspace deps |
| Cache module not exported | `common/src/lib.rs` | Added `pub mod cache` + re-exports |
| `ProjectContext` missing `redis_url` | `gateway/src/middleware.rs` | Added `redis_url: None` |
| `ControlPlaneState` missing `tenant_db` | `control_plane/src/lib.rs`, `gateway/src/main.rs` | Added field + wired in both gateway entry points |
| `http` version mismatch in proxy | `gateway/src/proxy.rs` | Converted between `reqwest` (http 0.2) and `axum` (http 1.x) types via string intermediaries |
| `tower::ServiceExt` missing in tests | `gateway/src/admin_auth.rs` | Added import; added `tower` dev-dependency |
---
## Deferred to Later Milestones
- **M1**: Argon2 hashing for `ADMIN_PASSWORD` (currently plaintext comparison)
- **M3**: Redis-backed CSRF state for OAuth flows
- **M3**: Redis-backed admin sessions (currently in-memory)
- **M3**: Proper OAuth identity linking with `identities` table